

Introduction

The Animal in Nietzsche's Philosophy

Extract from:

Vanessa Lemm, *Nietzsche's Animal Philosophy: Culture, Politics and the Animality of the Human Being*, New York: Fordham University Press, in press.

The theme of the animal was largely overlooked in 20th century Nietzsche scholarship and has only very recently started to attract attention in philosophy and the humanities.¹ This book aims to provide the first systematic treatment of the animal in Nietzsche's philosophy as a whole. I hope to show that the animal is neither a random theme nor a metaphorical device, but rather, stands at the center of Nietzsche's renewal of the practice and meaning of philosophy itself.² *Nietzsche's Animal Philosophy* critically re-examines Nietzsche's views on culture and civilization, politics and morality, history and truth from the various perspectives opened up by the consideration of the human being as part of a continuum of animal life.

Throughout his writings Nietzsche speaks of the human being as an animal. What distinguishes the human animal from other animals is its culture. *Nietzsche's Animal Philosophy* pursues the dual questions of what it means for an animal to have culture and how animality engenders culture. In contrast to the Western traditions of humanism and Enlightenment, Nietzsche proposes to investigate culture not as a rational and moral phenomenon, but as a phenomenon of life. Viewed in this way, what makes culture interesting is that it is taken up by animality and not, as these traditions assume, because culture is the means through which humanity separates or emancipates itself from animality. In her ground-breaking book *Beasts of Modern Imagination*, Margot Norris calls this new approach to culture from the perspective of life "biocentric." She defines a "biocentric tradition" of thinkers, writers and artists (including Nietzsche) who do not create *like* the animal or in imitation of the animal, but *as* the animal, with their animality speaking.³

This “biocentric” notion of culture in Nietzsche, as reconstructed in *Nietzsche’s Animal Philosophy*, is different from previous materialist and spiritualist interpretations of his philosophy of culture because it avoids the biologism of the first and the anthropomorphism of the second. An anthropocentric standpoint views culture as something disconnected from animal life: life is reduced to human self-interpretation and culture is the project of human self-creation.⁴ A biologicistic standpoint reduces culture to a means of preservation for the biological life of the human species.⁵ Although a biologicistic approach takes into account the intimate relationship that exists between human and animal life, it fails to provide an analysis of the meaning and significance of culture beyond its use in the struggle for survival. Rejecting a biologicistic interpretation of life, I consider Nietzsche’s thesis to be that every organic cell has spirit.⁶ Similarly rejecting an anthropocentric interpretation of life, I consider Nietzsche’s thesis to be that spirit is physiological.⁷ The principles of Nietzsche’s physiology, however, are not those derived by the application of mechanical or chemical causality to inert matter. They can only be formulated through genealogies, which alone capture the spiritual historicity expressed in physiology.⁸ Life is historical because matter is always already taken up in relation to memory and forgetfulness.

For Nietzsche, memory and forgetfulness are neither Kantian capacities of the mind nor Aristotelian potentials of substances, but equi-primordial forces of life. *Nietzsche’s Animal Philosophy* investigates the relationship between life and culture through an analysis of his conception of memory and forgetfulness. Most commentators identify Nietzsche’s notion of life with the will to power, and the will to power with memory.⁹ Instead, I argue that the notion of the will to power reflects an antagonism

between memory and forgetfulness and can be reformulated through this antagonism. I suggest that an analysis of this antagonism is the most direct way to access the relationship between life and culture, and, more specifically, the relationship between animality and culture. Speaking schematically, one can say that forgetfulness in Nietzsche's discourse belongs to the animal, memory to the human and promise to the overhuman. Since, in Nietzsche, their relationships are agonistic and not static, the animal, the human and the overhuman are tied to each other and cannot be separated into distinct stages of evolution: "The human being is a rope, tied between the animal and the overhuman" (Z: 4 "Prologue").¹⁰

Nietzsche affirms the continuity between the animal, the human and the overhuman. He believes that human life is inseparable from the life of the animal and of the whole organic and inorganic world. He even claims to have discovered himself to be a being who continuously reflects a repetition and variation of the infinite poetic, logical, aesthetic and affective becomings in the entire history of life (GS 54).¹¹ Nietzsche therefore rejects the view that human life constitutes an autonomous island within life. To the contrary, he holds that any form of life which is cut off from other forms of life declines because it is separated from that which generates its life. In keeping with this view, human life cannot bring itself forth by its strength alone, but lives entirely out of and against its relation to other forms of life.¹² Nietzsche's conception of life as a continuum breaks with the Western tradition of considering the human being as the crown of evolution (A 14). His notion of life is, in this sense, comparable to Darwin's.¹³ The perspective of continuity posits that human life does not play a central role in the totality of life, but is only a small and insignificant part of it. Nietzsche even speculates

that nature uses human life as a means towards its own completion rather than the other way round (*AOM* 185).

The totality of life is an inherently historical process which can be traced in the memory of each and every organic cell, down to the smallest entity (*KSA* 10:12[31]). From the perspective of organic memory, the becoming of one form of life is inextricably tied to that of all other forms of life.¹⁴ Every form of life lives off the totality, just like the totality lives off every singular form of life. The becoming of every moment and every organic cell is unique and singular in an absolute sense, but its uniqueness and singularity is what emerges out of and against the totality of life. No organic cell is like any other organic cell. No animal/human being is like any other animal/human being. Nevertheless, in their singularity each reflects the totality of life, the past, present and future of its becoming. What distinguishes the organic memory of each and every cell is that it does not recall the history of the totality of life into an ideal continuity. Rather, the memory of organic life is constituted by a continuous movement of “counter-becomings,” an antagonism against forgetfulness that dissolves what stabilizes itself into a fixed identity.¹⁵ The memory of organic life shows that the totality of life is not a stable and continuous whole striving towards the harmonious equilibrium of its parts.¹⁶ Instead, it is constituted by an agonistic struggle which involves all forms of life for and against each other in view of a continuous pluralization of inherently singular forms of life.¹⁷ Nietzsche holds that nature seeks the increasing pluralization of life and believes that this can be attained through culture as it emerges from an affirmation of the continuity that exists within the totality of animal, human, and other forms of life.¹⁸

In chapter one, “Culture and Civilization,” I investigate the openness of human life to the horizon of becoming through an analysis of the competition between culture and civilization (*KSA* 13:16[73]; 16[10]). By means of this antagonism, Nietzsche puts forth a critique of civilization that does not imply a “return to nature” but is oriented towards a cultivation of animality. I define culture as cultivation and education and distinguish it from civilization, which I define as taming and breeding. The process of civilization, as Nietzsche conceives it, reflects a process of moral and rational improvement of the human being which does not cultivate animal life but “extirpates” and oppresses it (*TI* “Improvers” and “Morality”; *GM* II: 1-3). In contrast to civilization, the challenge of culture is to bring forth forms of life and thought which are not forms of power over animal life, but which are full of life, overflowing with life.¹⁹ I argue that culture recovers this fullness of life in the dreams, illusions and passions of the animal.

Nietzsche repeatedly speaks of the return of the human being to its animal beginning as a return to the dream life of the animal (*GS* 54, *HH* 13). A return to the animal beginning of human beings reveals that life is a dream and to be alive is, essentially, to be dreaming. Nietzsche’s conception of life and culture breaks with the Western tradition of seeing the rationality and sociability of the human being as marks of distinction with respect to other forms of life. For Nietzsche, the future of humanity crucially depends on the human being’s ability to reconnect itself with the dream life of the animal because only the latter can bring back to the human being the freedom and creativity of interpretation that it has lost in the process of its civilization and socialization. Nietzsche’s approach is, in this sense, comparable to that of Freud for not only do both contest the claim that rationality lies at the center of psychic life, but they

both see in the dream-state the dissolution of civilization and consciousness, and, moreover, consider this dissolution to be crucial for the future enhancement of human life and culture.²⁰ For only if the human being recovers the freedom and creativity of dreams, will it be able to keep on living, that is, dreaming, imagining and inventing new forms of life to come.

In contrast to the traditional understanding of the overhuman in Nietzsche as the mythic embodiment of the self-sufficient individual (and of the autonomy of human culture, I argue that the overhuman is neither an expression of the human as a being independent from the rest of life or from the rest of its own species.²¹ Rather, becoming overhuman is dependent upon one's openness to the animality of the human being. Animality is not overcome and sublimated, but resists in humans as much as in the overhuman. Indeed, one can understand what Nietzsche means by overhuman only as a function of such an animal resistance.²² *Nietzsche's Animal Philosophy* examines the cultural and political significance of the resistance of the animal within the human. It argues that the resistance of the animal strives for an overcoming of domination towards freer forms of social and political life.

In chapter two, "Politics and Promise," I discuss the possibility of overcoming domination as it is articulated by the promise of the sovereign individual (*GM* II: 2). The promise of the sovereign individual has been traditionally understood as either anti-political with Nietzsche figuring as a precursor to totalitarian and authoritarian ideologies, or as non-political with Nietzsche figuring as precursor to individual perfectionism. In contrast to these views, I argue that through the figure of the sovereign individual, Nietzsche puts forward an idea of freedom as responsibility which inherently

concerns the political life of human animals. This interpretation of Nietzsche as a political thinker centers on the idea that the antagonism of human and animal life forces is the primary feature of human development: when humankind defines itself against its animality or denies its animality a productive role, forms of political life emerge based on domination and exploitation of humans by humans. Contrariwise, when humankind engages with its animality, it gives rise to forms of political life rooted in the sovereign individual's instinct of responsibility. This chapter seeks to show that responsibility, as Nietzsche conceives it, namely, as an instinct (*GM* II: 2), provides a way to understand the relationship between politics and animal life that moves beyond the political domination of life because it offers the animality of the human being a positive, creative role in the constitution of their social and political forms of life. As such, the promise of the sovereign individual in Nietzsche constitutes a political power that overcomes those practices which, since Foucault, we call bio-political.²³

In chapter three, "Culture and Economy," I further discuss the possibility of overcoming domination by differentiating between two different economical approaches to the animality of the human being which correspond to the contrasting ways of politicizing life in culture and in civilization. While the economy of civilization represents an exploitative approach to animality whose aim is the self-preservation of the group at the cost of normalizing the individual, the economy of culture stands for a non-exploitative approach to animality directed towards the pluralization of inherently singular forms of life. An analysis of these economies shows that "higher culture," as Nietzsche imagines it, is incompatible with a politics of domination and exploitation.

According to Nietzsche, human life is the weakest and most fragile form of animal life. The vulnerability of the human animal is related to its relative inferiority and under-determination with respect to other animals. Nietzsche claims that in order to overcome the dilemma of their relative weakness, humans have to “rob” the virtues of the other animals (*Z*: 22 “On Old and New Tablets”). They have to follow other animals and, in their own way, become more animal, more instinctive, more forgetful and more natural. In light of this idea, I suggest that the relationship between human life and culture must be understood in terms of a “becoming- animal” of the human being.²⁴ The becoming-animal of the human being is not a process of moral improvement or human self-perfection. On the contrary, its aim is the “magnification (*Vergrößerung*)” and “strengthening (*Verstärkung*)” of the human being (*KSA* 12:5[50]; 7[10]) attained through the recovery of animality.

In chapter four, “Giving and Forgiving,” I argue that Nietzsche’s rejection of Christianity is motivated by an idea of justice which has its source in the practice of gift-giving. Nietzsche contrasts gift-giving with the Christian practice of forgiving: the latter fails to break the cycle of revenge while the form of giving found in Christian forgiveness does not enhance human life, but rather poisons it (*AOM* 224, *BGE* 168). The double failure Nietzsche detects in the Christian practice of forgiveness results from denying the animality of the human being a productive role in the constitution of forms of sociability. In particular, it ignores the value and significance of animal forgetfulness. In this chapter I argue that animal forgetfulness is not only indispensable to breaking the cycle of revenge, but also to establishing a relationship with others which is not based on utilitarian grounds and which respects both the freedom and the differences of the other.

Because the forgetfulness of the animal is an essential component of Nietzsche's analysis of gift-giving, I suggest that the latter should be understood in the terms of an animal rather than a human virtue. The chapter concludes with a discussion of how Nietzsche's conception of justice as gift-giving opens to an alternative account of political friendship which he contrasts with the Christian demand to love thy neighbor as thyself.

For Nietzsche, human life is not a given, a substance or a nature, but rather something that becomes, something that, in the words of Ansell-Pearson, is "from the beginning of its formation and deformation implicated in an overhuman becoming."²⁵ The human being is, therefore, not an end in itself but an on-going movement of becoming and self-overcoming. Nietzsche's narrative of human becoming is, above all, a narrative of human self-overcoming: "What is great in the human being is that it is a bridge and not an end: what can be loved in the human being is that it is an *overture* (*Übergang*) and a *going under* (*Untergang*)" (Z: 4 "Prologue"). The intimate relationship among the animal, the human and the overhuman in Nietzsche is peculiar because the continuity it affirms also brings about their simultaneous discontinuity. Nietzsche questions the commonly held belief that human life grows out of its animal past according to a linear conception of time as something from which it derives or as something from which it has successfully emancipated itself from. Instead, animality features, in Nietzsche's thought, as an otherness, a reservoir of creative and regenerative forces of life that allows the human being to spring forward into the future.²⁶ For Nietzsche, the future emerges from the human's ability to overcome the self. In order to overcome itself, the human being needs to return to its animality (and animal forgetfulness). For this reason, the animal (forgetfulness) always stands at the beginning

and at the re-beginning of culture. It is through the return to and of their animality that human beings are led towards their humanity because it is the animal which withholds the secret of how to bring forth a relationship with the past that disrupts and overturns the present in favor of future life to come. In this view, becoming overhuman depends on a return of and to animality as that force which irrupts its humanity, exceeds it and tears it apart, so as to make room for its future (overhuman) becoming.

Nietzsche's Animal Philosophy discusses the idea that animality (forgetfulness) enables the becoming human (memory) of the human being through a reading of *On the Use and Disadvantage of History for Life*. Chapter five, "Animality, Creativity and Historicity," re-evaluates the importance of animality and animal forgetfulness in Nietzsche's conception of history and historiography. I argue that the novelty of Nietzsche's history essay is contained in the thesis that animal forgetfulness is prior to and more primordial than human memory. Life is historical through and through because it is forgetful through and through. I argue that the perspective of animal forgetfulness reveals that memory is an artistic force (*Kunsttrieb*), and that historiography must therefore be understood as a work of art (*Kunstwerk*) rather than as science, concerned with interpretations rather than with the factual representation of the past. According to Nietzsche's new conception of historiography, a truly effective history is found in the works of the artist rather than in those of the historian, even if the latter is artistic and not scientific. In the period from 1886 to 1888, Nietzsche re-edited all his books, adding new prefaces to his original editions. These prefaces reflect Nietzsche's re-reading and re-writing of his own past. Chapter five ends with a discussion of Nietzsche's prefaces as examples of an artistic writing of history.

It is partly due to Nietzsche's privileging of the perspective of the artist over that of the scientist in his understanding of the project of philosophy that commentators have identified him as a relativist and as a denier of truth. In contrast to such views, chapter six "Animality, Language and Truth," argues that Nietzsche's critique of metaphysics aims at a renewal of the meaning of philosophy as the pursuit of truth. I maintain that, throughout his work, Nietzsche holds on to the controversial claim, put forth in his early essay *On Truth and Lies in an Extra-moral Sense*, that truth is a metaphor, and that, for that reason, a consideration of truth is inseparable from a consideration of language. He contends that because truth is a metaphor, it fails to capture life, and, moreover, that metaphors are rationalizations and abstractions that destroy life. From this perspective, philosophy, understood as a conceptual pursuit of truth, seems doomed before it even begins. Nietzsche finds a way out of this dilemma by distinguishing between metaphors (*Metapher*) and intuited metaphors (*Anschaungsmetapher*) (*TL*). Whereas the former make up an abstract world of regulating and imperative (linguistic) laws by means of abstract thinking, the latter make up an intuited world of first impressions by means of pictorial thinking. While abstract thinking, indeed, constitutes a threat to life, pictorial thinking engenders pictures that emerge from the immediacy of an encounter with life. These pictures have the power to render the truth of the underlying life experience without destroying it. Chapter six provides the argument that the philosophical pursuit of truth can only be redeemed when philosophy does not separate conceptual and abstract forms of thought from their ground in pictorial and imaginary forms of thought as they are expressed in intuited metaphors. Pictorial thinking is a form of thought Nietzsche associates with the animals. A renewal of the meaning of philosophy as a pursuit of truth,

therefore, depends on the return to the animals' pictorial way of thinking. Consequently, animals in Nietzsche's philosophy are not simply metaphors or anthropomorphic projections that reinforce the traditional belief that animals are beings deprived of language. Rather, for Nietzsche, animal silence is the source of the metaphorical character of human animal language. Indeed, human animal language is most properly directed at the silence that affords the communication between human animals.

Nietzsche rediscovers the centrality of animal life to the self-understanding of the human being, to its culture and its politics. I wish to conclude with some remarks on how this recovery of animality in Nietzsche's philosophy contributes to an understanding of what Foucault calls the "biological threshold of modernity".²⁷ I suggest that Nietzsche provides a new and productive way of understanding the relationship between animality and humanity by viewing it as developing a positive sense of biopolitics. I propose that positive biopolitics sees in the continuity between human and animal life a source of resistance to the project of dominating and controlling life-processes. Whereas the latter divides life into opposing forms of species life, the positive biopolitics I set out subverts such a division in place of cultivating inherently singular forms of animal life.

¹ For a treatment of the animal theme in Nietzsche, see Christa D. Acampora and Ralph Acampora, *A Nietzschean Bestiary: Becoming Animal Beyond Docile and Brutal* (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004); Adrian Del Caro, *Grounding the Nietzsche Rhetoric of Earth* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2004), 401-416; Peter Atterton and Matthew Calarco, *Animal Philosophy* (London and New York: Continuum Press, 2004); Cary Wolfe, *Zoontologies: The Question of the Animal* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003); Akira Mizuta Lippit, *Electric Animal* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 55-73; Peter Steeves, *Animal Others: On Ethics, Ontology and Animal Life* (New York: Suny Press, 1999); Jennifer Ham, "Taming the Beast: Animality in Wedekind and Nietzsche," in *Animal Acts*, ed. Jennifer Ham and Matthew Senior (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), 145-163; Michel Haar, "Du symbolisme animal en général, et notamment du serpent" *Alter. Revue de Phénoménologie*, no. 3 (1995): 319-345; Margot Norris, *Beasts of Modern Imagination. Darwin, Nietzsche, Kafka, Ernst, and Lawrence* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 1-25, 53-100; T. J. Reed, "Nietzsche's Animals: Idea, Image and Influence," in *Nietzsche: Imaginary and Thought*, ed. Malcolm Pasley (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 159-219.

² For the view that the animal is a random theme in Nietzsche's philosophy, see, Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, vol. 1-2 (Stuttgart: Verlag Günter Neske, 1998). For the view that the animal is a metaphorical device in Nietzsche's philosophy, see Monika Langer, "The Role and the Status of the Animals in Nietzsche's Philosophy," in *Animal Others: On Ethics, Ontology and Animal Life*, ed. Peter Steeves (New York: Suny Press, 1999), 75-91.

³ According to Norris, “[t]his movement has two major, related consequences: a subversive interrogation of the anthropocentric premises of Western philosophy and art, and the invention of artistic and philosophical strategies that would allow the animal, the unconscious, the instincts, the body, to speak again in their work” (Norris, *Beasts of Modern Imagination*, 5).

⁴ For an example of this view, see Alexander Nehamas, *Nietzsche: Life as Literature* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985).

⁵ For an example of this view, see Gregory Moore, *Nietzsche, Biology and Metaphor* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002). Stiegler argues that Nietzsche’s notion of life should not be reduced to a mere metaphor but has to be taken seriously as an attempt to provide a properly biological conception of life. Nevertheless, she underlines that Nietzsche’s conception of life as will to power exceeds a biological, Darwinian notion of life insofar as it cannot be reduced to a struggle for survival. Barbara Stiegler, *Nietzsche et la biologie* (Paris: PUF, 2001), 7-8.

⁶ “I presuppose memory and some kind of spirit in everything organic: the apparatus is so subtle, that for us it does not seem to exist. What foolishness on Haeckel’s part, to equate two embryos with each other! One should not be deceived by the smallness of size” (*KSA* 11:25[403]).

⁷ For the notion of physiology in Nietzsche, see Volker Gerhardt, “Von der ästhetischen Metaphysik zur Physiologie der Kunst,” *Nietzsche-Studien* 13 (1984): 374-393, and Helmut Pfotenhauer, “Physiologie der Kunst als Kunst der Physiologie?” *Nietzsche-Studien* 13 (1984):399-411.

⁸ “All organic life is coordinated *as a visible movement (als sichtbare Bewegung)* in a *spiritual history (geistigen Geschehen)*. An organic being is the visible expression of a *spirit (eines Geistes)*” (KSA 11:26[35]).

⁹ For a recent example of the identification of will to power with memory, see Stiegler, *Nietzsche et la biologie*, 50-66.

¹⁰ With the exception of occasional emendations, throughout this book I rely on the following translations: Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Modern Library, 1995). Friedrich Nietzsche, *Human, All Too Human*, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, trans. J. Nauckoff (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy*, trans. R. Speirs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, trans. C. Diethe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). Friedrich Nietzsche, *Untimely Meditations*, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). Friedrich Nietzsche, *Daybreak*, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). Friedrich Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (London: Penguin Books, 1968). Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Antichrist*, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (London: Penguin Books, 1968). Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, ed. Walter Kaufmann, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1968). Friedrich Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, trans. R.J. Hollongdale (London: Penguin Books, 1979). Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1989). Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Pre-Platonic Philosophers*, trans. Greg Whitlock (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2001).

Friedrich Nietzsche, *Philosophy and Truth: Selections from Nietzsche's Notebooks of the Early 1870's*, trans. Daniel Breazeale (London: Humanities Press International, 1979).

The translations of the *Nachlass* are my own. I use the following editions on Nietzsche: Friedrich Nietzsche, *Sämtliche Werke, Kritische Studienausgabe in 15 Bänden*, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari (Berlin: de Gruyter Verlag, 1988). Friedrich Nietzsche, *Sämtliche Briefe, Kritische Studienausgabe in 8 Bänden* (Berlin: de Gruyter Verlag, 1986).

¹¹ See also *KSA* 11:34[167], where Nietzsche claims that the entire history of organic life is active in every judgment of the senses.

¹² Stiegler argues that life is directed towards openness, towards what advenes, because the enhancement of its proper internal power is inherently dependent upon the encounter of another power, even if this encounter brings with it the risk of death and suffering. See Stiegler, *Nietzsche et la biologie*, 73.

¹³ For a discussion of the similarities and dissimilarities between Nietzsche and Darwin, see Werner Stegmaier, "Darwin, Darwinismus, Nietzsche. Zum Problem der Evolution," *Nietzsche-Studien* 16 (1987): 264-287; Norris, *Beasts of Modern Imagination*, 1-53, and recently, Stiegler, *Nietzsche et la biologie*, 45ff.

¹⁴ "Continual transition forbids us to speak of 'individuals', etc; the 'number' of beings is itself in flux" (*WP* 520; see also the notion of "Seelen-continuum" in *KSA* 11:40[34]). Given the interrelatedness of all forms of life, Nietzsche also rejects the division between the inorganic and the organic world as prejudice: "The will to power also rules in the inorganic world, or rather there is no inorganic world. The 'effect of distance' cannot be abolished: *something attracts (heranziehen) something else, something else feels*

attracted (gezogen)” (KSA 11:34[247]). See also in comparison, *WP* 655, *GS* 109 and *KSA* 12:9[144].97.

¹⁵ What distinguishes the organic from the inorganic is its capacity “to *collect experiences (Erfahrungen aufammelt)*” and that it is “never identical to itself in its processes (*und niemals sich selber gleich ist, in seinem Prozesse*)” (KSA 10:12[31]).

¹⁶ “That the world is not striving toward a stable condition is the only thing that has been proved. Consequently, one must conceive its climatic conditions in such a way that it is not a condition of equilibrium –” (*WP* 639).

¹⁷ For an excellent discussion of Nietzsche’s notion of life as a struggle towards pluralization and singularization, see Wolfgang Müller-Lauter, “Der Organismus als innerer Kampf” in *Über Werden und Wille zur Macht, Nietzsche-Interpretationen I* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1999), 97-140.

¹⁸ Nietzsche contests the existence of something like the development of the human kind, instead his interest in cultivating plurality within the human being (KSA 11:34[179]).

¹⁹ Norris describes this challenge as follows: “But the bio-centricity of this tradition – its valuation of the body, its celebration of unmediated experience – renders its writings at war with themselves, hostile to art, impervious to representation, inimitable” (Norris, *Beasts of Modern Imagination*, 3). And further down, “of course, the paradox implicit in this caveat, of producing an art *within* culture, that is, not *of* culture, is only imperfectly resolvable in practice” (ibid., 15). See also Shapiro, who identifies the question of how to bring forth forms of culture that are full of life as a question explicit in Nietzsche’s *Untimely Considerations*: “How can meaningful stories be told that escape the encroachments of the ‘university culture machine’ and that offer a significant alternative

to the debilitating forms of historical consciousness that the same culture machine was celebrating as the highest manifestations of Western tradition?" (Gary Shapiro, *Nietzschean Narratives*, [Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1989], 21).

²⁰ Sigmund Freud, *Civilization and its Discontents*, (London: W.W. Norton, 1961). For a comprehensive discussion of the relationship between Nietzsche and Freud, see Johann Figl, *Von Nietzsche zu Freud. Übereinstimmungen und Differenzen von Denkmotiven* (Wien: 1996) and Günter Götde, "Wandelungen des Menschenbildes durch Nietzsche und Freud. Eine vergleichende Interpretation aus philosophiegeschichtlicher Perspektive," *Jahrbuch der Psychoanalyse* (1993): 119-166, as well as, by the same author "Eine neue Interpretation von Freuds Verhältnis zu Nietzsche," *Nietzsche-Studien* 27 (1998): 463-480.

²¹ For the view that the overhuman in Nietzsche embodies an idea of the self as autonomous and self-sufficient, see Giuliano Campioni, *Les lectures françaises de Nietzsche* (Paris: PUF, 2001), 51-107.

²² Norris also interprets the overhuman in Nietzsche as a recuperated animal, "an animal 'recovered' in both related senses of the word: as a human creature cured of its pathogenic culture and vitally reclaimed by its instinctual nature" (Norris, *Beasts of Modern Imagination*, 79).

²³ Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, vol. 1, (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), 133-159.

²⁴ I borrow the term "becoming-animal" from Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 232-309.

²⁵ Keith Ansell-Pearson, “On the Miscarriage of Life and the Future of the Human: Thinking Beyond the Human Condition with Nietzsche,” *Nietzsche-Studien* 29 (2000): 153-177. From the perspective of becoming, the English term “human being” is a contradiction in terms because humans never “are” but always become. I have therefore tried to avoid it as much as possible to remain faithful to Nietzsche’s conception of human life as something in becoming.

²⁶ For Nietzsche, human life not only incorporates the whole past chain of life (*KSA* 10:12[31]), but, more importantly, but also prefigures the future of the chain of life: “We are more than the individual: we are the whole chain as well, with the task of all the future of the chain” (*WP* 687).

²⁷ Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, 133-159.